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Article 5

What's Law Got to Do With It? Plea Bargaining Reform after Lafler and Frye
By
Cynthia Alkon1
I. Introduction:
This symposium poses an interesting question: What's left of the law in the wake of
ADR? I will address this question in the context of the criminal justice system in the United
States. As with civil cases, few criminal cases go to trial. Negotiated agreements through plea
bargaining have been the predominate form of case resolution since at least the mid-twentieth
century.2 As criminal caseloads rose, trial rates decreased, as they did for civil cases.3 Today,
only a small percentage of criminal cases go to trial.4 Plea bargaining, as with other forms of
alternative dispute resolution, is an informal process that operates largely outside the formal legal
system. Plea bargains are rarely negotiated on the record in open court. Instead, they are usually
negotiated in private between the defense and the prosecution and only announced in open court
and on the record once the deal is final and agreed to by all the parties. Does this mean the law
is absent in the process? And, does plea bargaining work to undermine the formal criminal codes
in the United States? The simple answer is that the formal criminal law provides the framework
for how plea bargaining works and also acts as a substantial impediment to serious plea
bargaining reform, an impediment that is often not recognized as scholars and practitioners focus
on the fact that the plea bargaining process itself operates with few rules and constraints.5
As with other dispute resolution processes, plea bargaining grew as a process largely
outside the law. Despite being used since colonial times,6 it was not until 1970 that the Supreme
1

Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law. Thank you to Professors Nancy Welsh, Tania Sourdin,
and Christopher Drahozal for their thoughtful comments and questions. Thank you to the Yearbook on Arbitration
and Mediation for all of their hard work in organizing the 2015 Symposium.
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For example, in 1962 just 15.39% of defendants went to trial in U.S. District Courts, with 53% of those defendants
having jury trials, the remaining were bench trials. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials
and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. OF E MPIRICAL L EGAL S TUD . 459, 554 (2001).
3

Id. at 492-98.

4

92-97% of resolved criminal cases are resolved through plea bargaining. Missouri v. Frye 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407
(2012).
5

An important article arguing for better regulation of plea bargaining is Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the PleaBargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 C AL . L. R EV . 1117 (2011) (cited in Lafler v.
Cooper 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1387 (2012)); see also Russell D. Covey, Plea-Bargaining Law after Lafler and Frye, 51
D UQ . L. R EV . 595 (2013); Darryl K. Brown, Lafler, Frye and Our Still-Unregulated Plea Bargaining System, 25
F ED . S ENT ’G . R EP. 131 (2012).
6

See, e.g., GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA 9-10
(2003) (by the nineteenth century plea bargaining was the “dominant means of resolving criminal cases”). See also
John H. Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 L AW & S OC ’Y R EV 261 (1979).
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Court recognized plea bargaining as constitutional.7 Since 1970, the Court and criminal codes
have remained largely silent on the plea bargaining process itself. There are rules surrounding
how a defendant should enter his plea of guilty on the record and in open court, but few
limitations or rules on how prosecutors or defense lawyers can or should go about negotiating
those plea deals.8 As a result, plea bargaining critics often focus on the shortage of law regulating
plea bargaining and call for new rules and laws to make it a better regulated process.9
However, as this article will discuss, plea bargaining is defined by the law, meaning that the law
is an important factor, if not the most important factor, in plea negotiations and plea bargaining
outcomes. Plea bargaining reform will therefore require substantive criminal law reform. This is
not to suggest that substantive criminal law reform is all that is required to address the problems
with plea bargaining, but rather that it is a key element that should be part of any meaningful
reform effort.10
Scholars have been highly critical of plea bargaining although it has been a part of our
criminal justice system since the founding of this nation.11 One of the earlier debates in plea
bargaining scholarship was whether to abolish plea bargaining entirely.12 A few jurisdictions
experimented, without much success, with banning plea bargaining.13 Professionals in the
criminal justice system are often not as critical of the process as scholars and instead often see
plea bargaining as a practical process through which they can manage their high caseloads.
Practitioners, therefore, often resist efforts to prevent the use of plea bargaining and find ways to
continue plea bargaining cases.14 Not surprisingly, the need to efficiently manage caseloads is
perhaps the most often cited reason for the heavy use of plea bargaining.15

7

Brady v. United States 397 U.S. 742, 751-52 (1970).

8

See discussion infra Section II.

9

See, e.g., Bibas supra note 5.

10

For a more detailed discussion of how complex plea bargaining is see generally Cynthia Alkon, The U.S. Supreme
Court’s Failure to Fix Plea Bargaining: The Impact of Lafler and Frye, 41 H ASTINGS C ONST . L. Q. 561 (2014).
11

See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 6, at 9-10.

12

See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 C ALIF. L. R EV . 652 (1981), Albert W.
Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50
U. C HI. L. R EV . 931 (1983); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 Y ALE L.J. 1979 (1992).
13

For a discussion of the bans in Alaska and the Bronx see Douglas D. Guidorizzi, Should We Really “Ban” Plea
Bargaining?: The Core Concerns of Plea Bargaining Critics, 47 E MORY L.J. 753, 774-779 (1998); for an example
from another jurisdiction see generally Robert A. Weninger, The Abolition of Plea Bargaining: A Case Study of El
Paso County, Texas, 35 UCLA L. R EV . 265 (1987).
14

15

See, e.g., Weninger, supra note 13, at 289-311 (judges routinely went around the ban. Id. at 306-08).

See, e.g., Alkon, supra note 10, at 589-590 (“Judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys all rely on plea
bargaining to manage their caseloads…[and] consider plea bargaining to be an indispensable part of how they do
their jobs and manage work-life balance.” Id.).

2  

Criminal justice reform in the 1970s and 1980s focused on being "tough on crime."16 As
a result, laws were passed in every state, and federally, that increased punishments, added
enhancements, and added mandatory sentencing provisions or guidelines.17 These increased
penalties gave prosecutors even more power in the plea bargaining process.18 The dramatic
increase in possible penalties exacerbated a longstanding concern of plea bargaining critics: that
the plea bargaining process is coercive and may lead to innocent defendants pleading guilty.
This problem became even more of a concern as penalties increased making the consequences of
losing at trial worse.19
A more recent wave of plea bargaining scholarship recognizes that plea bargaining is an
entrenched part of the criminal justice system and focuses instead on how to reform it.20 This
current wave of scholarship includes those who are critically examining plea bargaining after the
Supreme Court started taking a greater interest in the process, starting in 2010 with Padilla v.
Kentucky when the Court held that defendants have the right to be informed about the collateral
immigration consequences of a guilty plea.21 Scholarly interest increased again when the Court
decided the 2012 companion cases of Lafler v. Cooper22 and Missouri v. Frye23 when the Court
held for the first time that there is a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in plea
bargaining.

16

See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS,
40-58 (2012).
17

See, e.g., James Austin, et al., Unlocking America: Why and How to Reduce America’s Prison Population, T HE
JFA INSTITUTE 1, 4 (2007), http://www.jfa-associates.com/publications/srs/UnlockingAmerica.pdf.
18

For a more extensive discussion of how the structure of the laws give prosecutors greater power in plea bargaining
see Alkon, supra note 10, at 586-87.
19

This is referred to as the trial penalty. See, e.g., Nancy J. King et al., When Process Affects Punishment:
Differences in Sentences after Guilty Plea, Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines States, 105 C OLUM . L.
R EV . 959, 992 (2005) (reporting trial penalties ranging from thirteen percent to four hundred sixty-one percent).
20

See, e.g., Wesley MacNeil Oliver, Toward a Common Law of Plea Bargaining, K Y . L. J. 2013-2014 at 1; Rishi
Batra, Lafler and Frye: A New Constitutional Standard for Negotiation, 14 C ARDOZO J. C ONFLICT R ESOL . 309
(2013); Stephanos Bibas, The Duties of Non-Judicial Actors in Ensuring Competent Negotiation, 51 D UQ . L. R EV .
625 (2013); Covey, supra note 5; Nancy J. King, Plea Bargains That Waive Claims of Ineffective Assistance—
Waiving Padilla and Frye, 51 D UQ . L. R EV . 647 (2013); Wesley MacNeil Oliver, The Indirect Potential of Lafler
and Frye, 51 D UQ . L. R EV . 633 (2013); Stephanos Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining and Extrajudicial Reforms,
126 H ARV . L. R EV . 150 (2012); Stephanos Bibas, Taming Negotiated Justice, Yale L. J. Online (June 20, 2012);
Wesley M. Oliver, The Present and Future of Plea Bargaining: A Look at Missouri v. Frye and Lafler v. Cooper,
2012 C ATO S UP. C T . R EV . 257, http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/supreme-courtreview/2012/9/scr-2012-oliver.pdf.
21

Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).

22

Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).

23

Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
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Much of the most current scholarship on plea bargaining uses these recent Supreme Court
cases, most notably Lafler and Frye to recommend further reforms to plea bargaining.24
However, Padilla, Lafler, and Frye, were all cases in which the Court looked only at the question
of whether there was competent assistance of counsel during the client-counseling phase of plea
bargaining.25 The narrow focus of the Court in these cases has meant that many commentators
and scholars have been similarly focused on the defense lawyer role in plea bargaining or how to
provide better defense services.26 Some scholars have focused more generally on the need to
reform plea bargaining by adopting more procedural rules.27 Undoubtedly improving defense
services and improving the procedural framework are important areas for reform in the plea
bargaining process. Yet, the current wave of scholarship often fails to recognize the importance
of also reforming the substantive criminal law as a key component to meaningful plea bargaining
reform. This is due, in part, to a failure by many critics and commentators to more fully examine
bargaining behavior during plea negotiations and to their underlying assumption that plea
bargaining is a process that exists outside the law instead of a process that is defined by the
existing law.
This article will begin, in Section II, with a brief explanation of the few rules that regulate
the plea bargaining process. Section III will examine how plea bargaining works, focusing on
how the substantive criminal law impacts bargaining behavior. Section IV will discuss the
concern that plea bargaining is often overly coercive and how the substantive criminal law
contributes to the coercive atmosphere. Section V will consider the classic article, The Shadow
of the Law: The Case of Divorce28 and examine whether plea bargaining happens in the shadow
of the law. This article will use the shadow of the law concept and build off the analysis from
previous articles arguing that while plea bargaining is highly complex, it is time to reexamine
how the substantive criminal law impacts plea bargaining behavior and the importance of
substantive criminal law reform as part of the overall reform of the plea bargaining process.
Section VI will propose that plea bargaining reform efforts should include efforts to reform the
underlying criminal law using examples from California’s recent changes in the law to explore
the kinds off substantive criminal law reform that might contribute to plea bargaining reform.

24

See note 20 for a listing of some of these recent articles.

25

Jenny Roberts, Effective Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 Y ALE L. J. 2650, 2653 (2013).

26

See, e.g., Laurence A. Benner, Expanding the Right to Effective Counsel at Plea Bargaining, 27 C RIM . JUST . 4
(2012); Richard E. Myers II, The Future of Effective Assistance of Counsel: Rereading Cronic and Strickland in
Light of Padilla, Frye and Lafler, 45 T EX . T ECH L. R EV . 229 (2012); Ronald Wright, Padilla and the Delivery of
Integrated Criminal Defense, 58 UCLA L. R EV . 1515 (2011).
27

See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 5; Oliver, Toward a Common Law of Plea Bargaining, supra note 20; Batra, supra
note 20.
28

Robert H. Mnookin & Lewish Kornhausert, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Y ALE
L. J. 950 (1979).
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II. The Laws Regulating Plea Bargaining
Critics complain that the plea bargaining process operates too informally as there are few
rules to regulate how the prosecution and defense negotiate plea deals.29 Historically, the
Supreme Court has been more interested in regulating trials and less interested in plea
bargaining.30 Despite its widespread use, it wasn’t until 1970 that the Supreme Court, in Brady
v. United States, specifically recognized the constitutionality of plea bargaining.31 The Court has
held that a guilty plea must be must be voluntary and intelligent.32 The Court has said this means
that the defendant understands what he is doing, acts freely and knowingly, and accepts (or
declines) a plea bargain without physical coercion.33 There are few constraints on how
prosecutors approach plea bargaining.34 One exception is that prosecutors should not breach
previous agreements.35 For example, the Court remanded a case when the prosecutor failed to
stick to the original plea agreement after the defendant entered his plea of guilty36 as to do
otherwise would be an “unfulfilled promise” or governmental deception.37 The court has not
considered threats of worse punishment or additional charges to be illegal coercion. For
example, in Brady, the Court decided that the defendant deciding to take the deal to avoid the
death penalty was not a violation.38 In Brady the Court held that the defendant accepted the deal
knowingly and voluntarily, and that a prosecutor’s threat to seek the death penalty if the deal was

29

See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 5; Susan R. Klein, Plea Bargaining after Lafler and Frye, 51 D UQ . L. R EV . 559
(2013).
30

See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 5, at 1123 (“The law of criminal procedure is primarily a law of trials and preparation
for trials.”).
31

Brady v. United States 397 U.S. 742, 751-52 (1970)(“[G]uilty pleas are not constitutionally forbidden.” Id.).

32. Id. at 748.
33. Id. at 748–50.
34

See e.g., Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Power, Discretion, and Misconduct, 27-30, 23-SPG C RIM .
JUST . 24 (2008) (a general discussion of prosecutorial discretion and why courts defer to prosecutors imposing few
rules or constraints on the exercise of their discretion).
35

Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) (The fact that the prosecutor who made the agreement is no
longer handling the case does not change this as “[t]he staff lawyers in a prosecutor’s office have the burden of
‘letting the left hand know what the right hand is doing’ or has done. That the breach of agreement was inadvertent
does not lessen its impact.” Id. at 262).
36   Id. (“[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be
said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” Additionally, “appropriate
recognition of the duties of the prosecution in relation to promises made in the negotiation of pleas of guilty will be
best served by remanding the case…”).
37   Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 505 (1984) (distinguishing the facts from Santobello).
38 397 U.S. at 755.
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not accepted was not coercive because the death penalty could be lawfully imposed.39 The Court
has also held that it is not a violation of due process if a prosecutor threatens to re-indict the
defendant with more serious charges if he refuses the plea deal.40 In practice, as there are no
rules to prevent it, prosecutors can (and do) threaten to add additional charges or enhancements if
the defendant does not accept the plea deal.41 As will be discussed below, prosecutorial threats to
add more charges or enhancements puts more pressure on defendants to accept deals as the
consequences of failing to do so can be so much more serious.42 Threats of additional charges
and enhancements increases the concern about the overall coercive atmosphere of plea bargaining
including the reality that innocent defendants may plead guilty.43
Just as the Court has had a very narrow reading of what is coercion in the plea bargaining
context, the Court has considered plea deals “intelligent” even if the defendant lacks information
about the evidence that will be admitted at trial against him or how that may impact his chances
of conviction.44 In general, under Brady v. Maryland, the prosecutor must disclose “evidence
favorable to the accused . . . where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment.”45
Brady, did not, however involve a plea bargain and the Court has not specified what evidence
must be disclosed before a plea deal. In 2002, in U.S. v. Ruiz, the U.S. Supreme Court decided,
in part, that a defendant did not have a constitutional right to impeachment information before
entering a plea agreement.46 This creates a problem in that it may limit the leverage a defendant
might have in plea negotiations, as impeachment evidence may help to secure a better deal. It
also means that defendants may be accepting plea deals without ever knowing that they have this
possible leverage.47 So far the Court has not held that there is a defense right to open-file
discovery, which means that defendants are often entering guilty pleas without knowing all of
the evidence the prosecution may have, including evidence that may increase their bargaining
power. There are also, unfortunately, examples of the prosecution failing to turn over

39 Id. at 751.
40 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364–65 (1978). William Stuntz stated, “In retrospect, Bordenkircher

appears to be one of the great missed opportunities of American constitutional law.” William J. Stuntz,
Bordenkircher v. Hayes: The Rise of Plea Bargaining and the Decline of the Rule of Law (Harv. Pub. L. Working
Paper No. 120, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=854284.
41

See e.g., G. NICHOLAS HERMAN, PLEA BARGAINING, 87 (3rd ed. 2012).

42

See infra Section V.

43

See infra Section V; Alkon, supra note 10, at 595-605.

44

397 U.S. at 757; see also United States v. Ruiz 536 U.S. 622 (2002).

45

Brady v. Maryland 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).

46

536 U.S. at 625.

47

For a longer analysis of the problem of lack of defense discovery and a recommendation to adopt open file
discovery law see generally Cynthia Alkon, The Right to Defense Discovery in Plea Bargaining Fifty Years after
Brady v. Maryland 38 N.Y.U. R EV . L. & S OC . C HANGE 407 (2014).
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exculpatory evidence as Brady v. Maryland clearly requires.48 Plea bargaining reform
proponents, including myself, have called for open file discovery as one procedural rule to better
protect defendants to ensure that they have all of the information in the case both to help in the
negotiation process and in their decision-making about whether to accept the plea offer or not.49
Since 2010, the Court has decided three cases involving plea bargaining that have helped
to carve out some minimally better regulation in one part of the plea bargaining process: the
client counseling phase.50 In Padilla v. Kentucky, the Court held that the defendant has the right
to be advised by his lawyer about the collateral immigration consequences of his guilty plea and
that failure to do so is a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.51 In 2012, the Court
decided the companion cases of Lafler v. Cooper52 and Missouri v. Frye.53 In Frye the Court
held that the defendant’s sixth amendment right to counsel had been violated when the
defendant’s lawyer failed to convey a plea offer before it expired.54 In Lafler the defendant’s
lawyer conveyed the offer, but wrongly advised his client that the prosecution “would be unable
to establish intent to murder” because the victim was shot below the waist (despite being shot
four times).55 This was so clearly incorrect that the parties on appeal agreed that the advice fell
below the required “objective standard of reasonableness.”56 Based on this poor advice, the
defendant turned down a plea deal that was over one-third less than his eventual sentence.57
48

For example, the prosecution in the Michael Morton case failed to turn over exculpatory evidence, in violation of
Brady. Michael Morton was wrongly convicted for murdering his wife and served twenty-five years in the Texas
prison system. The prosecutor who failed to turn over the evidence, Ken Anderson, was later convicted and
sentenced to ten days in jail for the violation of the law. For a longer discussion of the Michael Morton case see
Alkon, supra note 47 at 419-21.
49

See, e.g., Alkon, supra note 47; John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea
Bargaining, 50 E MORY L.J. 437 (2001). For articles more generally recommending open file discovery see Daniel S.
Medwed, Brady’s Bunch of Flaws, 67 W ASH . & L EE L. R EV . 1533 (2010); Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory
Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the Disbarment of Mike Nifong: The Critical Importance of Full Open-File
Discovery, 15 G EO . M ASON L. R EV . 257 (2008).
50

Jenny Roberts, Effective Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2650, 2653 (2013).

51

Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). Bibas, supra note 5, at 1120 (“With Padilla, the Court has now begun
to interpret due process and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to impose meaningful safeguards on the plea
process.”).
52

132 S. Ct. 1376.

53

132 S. Ct. 1399.

54

Id. at 1404.

55

Id. at 1380.

56

Id. at 1384 (“In this case all parties agree the performance of respondent’s counsel was deficient when he advised
respondent to reject the plea offer on the grounds he could not be convicted at trial. In light of this concession, it is
unnecessary for this Court to explore the issue.” Id.)
57

Id. at 1383-84 (He rejected an offer of 51-85 months in prison (4.25-7.08 years) and was sentenced to 185-360
months in prison (15.4 -30 years) after the jury convicted him at trial.).
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There were no errors in the trial itself, but the Court concluded that the trial did not cure
whatever problems may have occurred during the plea bargaining process and specifically said
“[e]ven if the trial itself is free from constitutional flaw, the defendant who goes to trial instead
of taking a more favorable plea may be prejudiced from either a conviction on more serious
counts or the imposition of a more severe sentence.”58 The Court, thereby, recognized the fact
that plea deals are often significant discounts from what a defendant will get if they go to trial
and are convicted.
Beyond these few constitutional requirements, there are statutory requirements.
However, many of the statutory rules simply reflect the constitutional minimums that the Court
has established and therefore concentrate on procedural issues.59 The rules surrounding plea
bargaining do not focus on the negotiation process itself, but rather the formal process of the
defendant entering a guilty plea and the court accepting it after the prosecution and defense have
agreed on a deal.60 For example, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states what
rights a judge must advise the defendant that he is waiving, and that the judge should get the
factual basis for the plea.61 Rule 11 also states that the defendant should be advised about the
charges, and the maximum and minimum penalties.62 There are also rules concerning what
judges can and cannot do, for example, under the Federal Rules, judges cannot “participate” in
plea negotiation discussions.63 The rules in state criminal procedure codes regarding plea
bargaining also tend to focus more on the form of the guilty plea and procedures surrounding
accepting the plea in court.64
Many scholars calling for plea bargaining reform focus on the lack of regulation in the
plea bargaining process. As Stafanos Bibas observed, “…a $100 credit-card purchase of a
microwave oven is regulated more carefully than a guilty plea that results in years of
imprisonment.”65 Bibas has been in the forefront in calling for better regulations and looking to
other possible models such as consumer protection.66 Bibas’ recommendations include some
specifically aimed at decreasing the potentially coercive atmosphere of plea bargaining. For
58

132 S. Ct. at 1386.

59

Bibas, supra note 5, at 1124.

60

See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (holding that there needs to be a record to establish that the
defendant voluntarily and knowingly entered his plea); Bibas, supra note 5, at 1124.
61

FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1), (b)(3).

62

Id.

63

F ED . R. C RIM . P. 11(c)(1); for a recent decision holding that a violation of this rule is not grounds to vacate a
guilty plea see U.S. v. Davila, 133 S. Ct. 2139 (2013).
64

See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13 (West 2011).

65

Bibas, supra note 5, at 1153.

66

See generally Bibas, supra note 5, at 1151-1158.
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example, Bibas recommends a “cooling-off period” for any plea deals involving five or more
years of imprisonment.67 However, as will be discussed below, improving the procedural rules
that surround plea bargaining, while important, will not fully address the concern that plea
bargaining is unduly coercive because of the pressure prosecutors can put on defendants by
threatening to apply the potentially severe penalties written into the criminal codes themselves.
III. How Plea Bargaining Works:
“Plea bargaining is a form of negotiation by which the prosecutor and defense counsel
enter into an agreement resolving one or more criminal charges against the defendant without a
trial.”68 There is no right to a plea bargain which means it is entirely within the discretion of the
prosecutor to decide whether to offer a deal.69 If there is a plea deal, it is not final unless the
judge agrees to accept it.70 There are three basic types of plea bargaining: charge bargaining,
sentence bargaining and sentence recommendation agreements.71 In charge bargaining, the
negotiation is about whether the prosecutor may agree to dismiss one or more of the charges or
to not charge particular offenses in exchange for a guilty plea.72 In sentence bargaining the
prosecution and defense negotiate about the sentence or punishment.73 Plea negotiations often
include both sentence and charge bargaining.74 A third form of plea bargaining, sentencing
recommendations agreements, is more common in the federal system and is when the prosecutor
agrees to recommend a particular sentence to the judge. 75
67

Bibas, supra note 5, at 1155. Nancy Welsh suggested a cooling-off period in mediation to help address concerns
about coercive mediation practices (“muscle mediation”). Nancy Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination
in Court-Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization? 6 H ARV . N EGOTIATION L. R EV . 1, 6-7
(2001).
68

HERMAN, supra note 41 at 1.

69

This does not mean that defendants must always go forward to trial, as the defendant may have the option to
“plead open” to the court, leaving it to the judge to decide the sentence, with or without the benefit of a pre-arranged
plea deal. However, if the defendant pleads open to the court he is “pleading to the sheet” meaning he will have to
plead to all charges, as filed, as the judge will not be able to dismiss any charges or enhancements on her own
motion. See, e.g., Eric M. Matheny, The Risks of Pleading Open to the Court, E RIC M ATHENY L. B LOG (Mar. 3,
2012, 12:55 PM), http://www.ericmathenylaw.com/Criminal-Defense-Blog/2012/March/The-Risks-Of-PleadingOpen-To-The-Court.aspx.
70

H ERMAN , supra note 41 at, at 109-12 (listing the role of the judge in “finalizing the bargain).

71.   See, e.g., H ERMAN , supra note 41 at 1–2.
72.   For a more extensive list of possible plea bargaining outcomes, see id. at 104–06. For purposes of simplicity, this
article will often refer to “guilty pleas” and not also include no-contest or Alford pleas. See e.g., H ERMAN , supra
note 41 at 189-91.
73.   See id. at 1-2.
74.   See id.
75.U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2014 GUIDELINES MANUAL [USSG] § 6B1.2(b) (Nov. 2014), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/guidelines-manual/2014/2014-chapter-6#6b12.
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Depending on the seriousness and complexity of the case, plea negotiations can be simple
and fast or complex and drawn out. 76 Plea bargaining is often a multi-party negotiation as not
only must the prosecutor and defense lawyer agree, but also the defendant and the judge, and in
some cases the prosecutor’s boss.77 Victims do not have a formal role, although in many
jurisdictions they must be informed about any plea deal.78 Police officers also have no formal
role, and, unless they are a victim, may not be notified about the deal until after it is concluded (if
at all). However, police officers and victims, despite the fact that they have no formal role in the
plea negotiation, can informally exert influence over the prosecutor.
Plea negotiations can be as simple as an offer from the prosecutor that is accepted by the
defense without any counter-offers. Or the negotiation may involve the defense sharing
information about possible defenses and possible motions (such as a search and seizure motion)
with the goal being to persuade the prosecutor to reduce the charge or reduce the sentence or
both. Plea negotiations are usually conducted off the record, even if the negotiation is in open
court. At some point the plea offer may be reduced to writing or the offer may be stated on the
record in court.79
Because plea bargaining tends to happen in private, it is harder to study and analyze than,
for example, trials. Empirical studies of plea bargaining often focus on the outcome of the plea

76. See, e.g., H ERMAN , supra note 41 at 75-87 (describing various plea bargaining tactics including “quick pleas”),
89-109 (describing how plea negotiations are done). In simple cases—such as driving under the influence of alcohol
or drug cases—prosecutors and defense lawyers know the “standard deal” in the individual court or jurisdiction.
The “negotiation,” thus, often simply consists of the prosecutor stating the offer and the defense lawyer confirming
that her client accepts the deal. See D OUGLAS W. M AYNARD , INSIDE P LEA B ARGAINING : T HE L ANGUAGE OF
N EGOTIATION 78 (1984) (referring to these types of plea negotiations as “routine processing” Id., and at 104-07).
77

For a discussion about plea bargaining as a multi-party negotiation see Alkon, supra note 47 at 413-14.

78

For a general description of victims’ rights in criminal cases see About Victims’ Rights,
https://www.victimlaw.org/victimlaw/pages/victimsRight.jsp (last visited Sept. 6, 2015). For a recommendation of
more victim involvement see e.g., STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 150-53 (2012).
79

This has become more common after the 2012 cases of Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012) and Missouri v.
Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012). For more information on the efforts to place more information on the record regarding
plea offers post-Lafler and Frye see Alkon, supra note 10 at 617-18.
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negotiation as that is something that is both easier to determine and to measure.80 There have,
however, been studies of plea bargaining that have attempted to examine the negotiation process
in more detail. One such study was conducted in the early 1980s and used conversational
analysis to examine how plea bargaining worked and the skills the lawyers used while
negotiating misdemeanor cases.81 One observation from this study was that plea negotiations
tend to happen in “spurts and starts” in between other conversations the lawyers are having in
court, in between the judge calling cases, and other defense lawyers trying to talk to the
prosecutor.82 Criminal courts can be chaotic places and misdemeanor courts even more so.83
But, unlike negotiation or mediation of civil cases which may happen far away from the formal
trappings of the court system, plea bargaining more often happens in courtrooms and
courthouses.
One distinction in plea bargains is between those that are routine and those that are not.
Routine plea bargains are those cases in which the prosecution and the defense agree on what the
case is worth and “they do not ‘really negotiate.’”84 However, as Douglas Maynard noted, a case
that is resolved without apparent negotiation “still reflects strategic and systematic negotiational
efforts.”85 The charge, the facts, and the prior criminal record of the defendant are all a part of
the analysis for the defense in determining whether the prosecutor’s first offer is acceptable.86
The other type of plea negotiation is one where the defense attorney does not accept the
prosecutor’s first offer.87 In these cases, Maynard observed, lawyers will typically discuss facts
80

For examples of empirical studies examining plea bargaining outcomes focused on whether the type of lawyer
(public defender, publicly appointed private counsel or private counsel) makes a difference in case outcomes see,
e.g., ROGER HANSON, BRIAN OSTROM, WILLIAM HEWITT, AND CHRISTOPHER LOMVARDIAS, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE
COURTS, INDIGENT DEFENDERS: GET THE JOB DONE AND DONE WELL (1992); James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton,
How Much Difference Does the Lawyer Make? The Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes, 22 YALE
L.J 154 (2012); Richard D. Harley, et.al., Do You Get What you Pay for? Type of Counsel and Its Effect on Criminal
Court Outcomes, 38 J. OF C RIM . JUST . 1063 (2010); Morris B. Hoffman, Paul H. Rubin & Joanna M. Shepherd, An
Empirical Study of Public Defender Effectiveness: Self-Selection by the “Marginally Indigent”, 3 O HIO S T . J. C RIM .
L. 223 (2005); Radha Iyengar, An Analysis of the Performance of Federal Indigent Defense Counsel (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13187, 2007), available at https://www.nber.org/papers/w13187; Thomas H.
Cohen, Who’s Better at Defending Criminals? Does type of Defense Attorney Matter in Terms of Producing
Favorable Case Outcomes? https://ssrn.com/abstract= 1876474; Michael Roach, Explaining the Outcome Gap
between Different Types of Indigent Defense Counsel: Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard Effects, (Apr. 2011),
http:ssrn.com/abstract=1839651.
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DOUGLAS W. MAYNARD, INSIDE PLEA BARGAINING: THE LANGUAGE OF NEGOTIATION, 1-4 (1984).
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For the classic study of misdemeanor courts see generally MALCOM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE
PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1979).
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MAYNARD supra note 79, at 104.
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Id.
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Id. at 104-07 (describing several routine plea agreements and why the fact of little discussion does not mean there
was no negotiation).
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that might show weaknesses in the prosecutor’s case and factors about the defendant that might
support a more lenient penalty.88
The starting point in any plea negotiation is the charges. A defense lawyer will evaluate
whether the prosecutor has sufficient evidence to prove the charges, and if there are any
weaknesses in the case, these weaknesses will be used to argue for a reduced charge and/or a
reduced sentence. For example, if the charge is possession for sale of a controlled substance, the
defense attorney may argue that the surrounding circumstances and the amount of the drug will
make it difficult for the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the drugs were
possessed for sale and that, therefore, the prosecutor should reduce the charge to a simple
possession of a controlled substance and that the penalty should also be reduced. Defense
lawyers will also evaluate whether there are additional charges or enhancements that could be
added that could increase the possible maximum penalty as part of deciding whether the offer is
fair. The charge or potential charges are a key starting point because whatever crime the
defendant is accused of violating, or could be accused of violating, is what determines the
possible maximum penalty.89
Defendants who do not accept a plea deal and instead go to trial and lose, can expect to
get a higher sentence than they would have gotten through plea bargaining.90 This is often
referred to as the “trial penalty” and researchers report that defendants who go to trial and are
found guilty can receive prison sentences that are over four times higher than those who plead
guilty.91 Stefanos Bibas explains that the “expected post-trial sentence is imposed in only a few
percent of cases” which means it is “like the sticker price for cars: only an ignorant, ill-advised
consumer would view the full price as the norm and anything less as a bargain.”92 However, the
87

M AYNARD supra note 79, at 107. Maynard refers to these types of plea bargains as “adversarial” although later
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(2012).
90

For a scathing report on how the trial penalty impacts plea bargaining in felony drug cases in the United States, see
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fact that defendants don’t plead out to the maximum, doesn’t mean that the maximum possible
sentence don’t anchor the plea negotiations. As will be discussed later, a defendant’s fear of a
high maximum sentence can raise concerns of coercion in the plea bargaining process and
innocent defendants have plead guilty to avoid the risk of trial and the potentially dramatically
higher maximum sentence.93
One empirical study looking at plea bargaining outcomes concluded that the criminal
code mattered in terms of plea outcomes and how prosecutors bargained in particular cases.94
The more options a prosecutor had under the law to reduce the charges, without reducing to a
misdemeanor, the more likely they were to reduce the charges and along with that, the
sentence.95 Ronald Wright and Rodney Engen concluded that “the substantive criminal law
determines the outcome of the criminal process” and that plea bargaining does not mean that the
parties “negotiate a customized outcome without regard to the legal rules.”96 Instead, the law
creates “starting points” for the negotiation.97 One question was whether prosecutors still
exercise wide discretion when there are sentencing guidelines and mandatory sentencing
provisions. Wright and Engen examined previous empirical studies that found it was “clear that
prosecutors circumvent guidelines through charge bargaining in a sizeable minority of cases.”98
Wright and Engen also found that to be true in the data they collected. They looked at two
factors, the “depth” and “distance” of the criminal code. The “depth” of the criminal code is
determined by whether there are a lot, or just a few, charging options for similar facts.99 The
“distance” is the “relative difference in the sentences that attach to the more- and less-serious
charging options.”100 Wright and Engen found that the charges are more likely to be reduced
when there is more depth, meaning more options for the prosecutor to choose from. It is less
likely if there is a large distance, meaning big differences in sentences.101 This study confirmed
that plea bargaining is not a process that takes place outside the legal system but instead is a
process that is, as will be discussed below, framed by the substantive law.102
93

See infra Section IV. See, e.g., Ronald Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal
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Bibas observed that until 2010, when Padilla v. Kentucky103 was decided, the Supreme
Court’s “world was binary: defendants were either guilty or not guilty” and that the Court
“ignored the varieties of possible charges and the gradations of sentences that might fit a
crime.”104 The substantive criminal law makes a substantial difference in terms of how plea
bargaining works.105 Prosecutors have the power and discretion to charge any offense that the
facts arguably support.106 Since the 1970s, legislatures in every state, and the U.S. Congress,
have increased penalties for crimes, created new crimes, added habitual offender statutes, and
increased sentences through enhancements for things like using a gun or committing a crime in a
school zone.107 The changes in the substantive criminal law have given prosecutors more
leverage in plea bargaining and made plea bargaining a much higher stakes process for
defendants who face significantly higher sentences if they reject the plea offer.108 As was
discussed above, thus far the Supreme Court has shown little interest in sentencing issues in plea
bargaining in large part due to the tendency to take “trials as the norm and thus post-trial
punishments as the normative baseline.”109 Scholars have also tended to focus more of their
attention on better regulating the process of plea bargaining and less on the impact of the
substantive criminal law on how plea bargaining actually works.110 However, the substantive
criminal law is part of the reason that the plea bargaining atmosphere can be coercive, as will be
discussed below.
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For a notable exception, see Wright & Engen supra note 94.

IV. Concerns About Plea Bargaining
Critics have expressed serious concerns for decades about how plea bargaining works and
about the fact that it is the predominate process to resolve criminal cases in the United States.
Those expressing concern about the heavy use of plea bargaining question whether it undermines
our adversarial system of justice.111 There is also the concern that plea bargaining fails to give
victims a voice112 or to offer procedural justice generally.113 Other concerns are that plea
bargaining encourages defendants to “game” the system114 and that it leads to disparate
sentencing.115 Critics have also looked at the overall atmosphere and expressed concern that plea
bargaining acts as a form of torture116 and is unduly coercive.117 Some have suggested
procedural reform to address the concern about undue coercion in plea bargaining.118 Better
regulation of the plea bargaining process, including putting greater restrictions on prosecutorial
hard bargaining behavior, could help to reduce the pressure placed on many defendants to plead
guilty. However, procedural protections alone can’t fully address the problem of coercion as it is
often the underlying criminal law, and the possibility of an extremely high penalty, that places
pressure on defendants to accept the prosecutor’s offer.119
One concern is that innocent defendants are pleading guilty due to concerns about
possibly heavy penalties after trial. For example, seventeen percent of those exonerated in 2013
first plead guilty to the charges.120 Overall, out of the 329 DNA exonerations nationwide, thirtyone (or just over nine percent) plead to the crime before being exonerated.121 This means that we
111
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know that innocent people are pleading guilty.122 One reason that innocent people may plead
guilty is because “the offer is too good to refuse”123 which is tied to defendants evaluating the
possible maximum compared to the plea offer.124 Innocent defendants may also be more risk
averse than the guilty and more likely, therefore, to take deals. 125
Oren Gazal-Ayal and Avishalom Tor examined whether innocent defendants are more
likely to take deals.126 Gazal-Ayal and Tor suggested that one possible reform to lessen the
problem of innocent defendants taking plea deals would be to place restrictions on plea offers.127
They suggest to “limit the magnitude of plea discounts or, alternatively, or trial penalties.” 128
The way they suggest this should be accomplished is that judges should “reject plea agreements
that include a sentence that is significantly lower than the sentence expected following conviction
by a jury trial.”129 Gazal-Ayal and Tor confidently predict that this will “result in plea
rejections by those defendants who require deeper discounts in exchange for their guilty pleas”
which will reduce the number of innocent defendants who plead guilty.130 While this might
prevent some of the most extreme examples of hard bargaining, it will also likely result in more
trials and more convictions and higher sentences for innocent defendants who might otherwise,
at least, have benefitted from a reduced sentence.131 Gazal-Ayal and Tor do not
discuss the need to also reduce mandatory sentencing provisions, sentencing enhancements, or
long possible maximum sentences as part of how this proposal might help to reduce the pressure
on innocent defendants to plead guilty. As with other scholars who focus on procedural reform,
Gazal-Ayal and Tor fail to also examine the underlying criminal law and recommend changes to
the law in addition to the procedural changes.
122
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On example of how extreme possible sentences can work in the plea bargaining context is
the case of Marissa Alexander. Ms. Alexander was charged with aggravated assault with a deadly
weapon in Florida.132 The case started when Ms. Alexander shot her gun in the air “one time”
during a fight with her estranged husband.133 Ms. Alexander’s defense was that on the day in
question her husband grabbed her neck and threatened to kill her.134 The trial judge, in error,
shifted the burden of proof in the “stand your ground” defense to Ms. Alexander during jury
instructions.135 The jury convicted Ms. Alexander and due to the mandatory “use a gun” law136
in Florida, Ms. Alexander was sentenced to twenty years in prison.137 Ms. Alexander’s case was
overturned on appeal due to an error in the jury instructions and sent back for a re-trial.138
Before her first trial the prosecution offered three years in prison in exchange for a guilty plea to
aggravated assault (without the gun use allegation).139 Ms. Alexander rejected that deal and went
to trial. After the appellate court ordered a re-trial, the prosecutor added additional charges of
aggravated assault, one for each of her two children who were present, in addition to her
estranged husband. Those additional charges made the possible maximum sentence sixty years in
prison, as there was a mandatory twenty year “use a gun” allegation with each charge.140
Ms. Alexander was faced with a decision that is all too typical. She could reject the deal
and go to trial on what appeared to be a solid self-defense claim. However, she had already lost
at trial (albeit with bad jury instructions). If she lost at trial again, and on all charges, she would
be sentenced to sixty years in prison. Or she could take the three year plea deal that the
prosecutor eventually offered again. By the time the offer was renewed, Ms. Alexander was just
weeks away from completing the three year term.141 Defendants are regularly faced with “time132
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served” or nearly time-served deals or extremely high sentences if they go to trial and lose.142 As
Ms. Alexander experienced, if she was convicted, she could expect to get the maximum. As is
no surprise, on reflection, Ms. Alexander decided to accept the plea deal.143 What is never
explained is why the same act would be worth three years in prison after a guilty plea, but twenty
or sixty years after a trial, an example of a significant trial penalty of 566% to 1900%. Simply
taking the possibility of the three-year offer off the table, as Gazal-Ayal and Tor suggest as one
possible reform, would not have helped Ms. Alexander. She would have been forced to go to
trial and risked another jury, even with proper instructions, convicting and sending her to prison
for sixty years. However, if the underlying law was changed, and Ms. Alexander was looking at
a much lower possible sentence, the risk of going to trial would be that much lower and one that
she might have been willing to take.
Ms. Alexander’s case illustrates how the substantive criminal law can be used to create a
coercive atmosphere. Prosecutors have discretion to file charges that carry the maximum penalty
(or not) and they can decide to add (or not) enhancement allegations, like the “use a gun”
enhancement in Florida. However, if the law allows for these charges, it is unrealistic to assume
that prosecutors won’t use the charges and that they won’t use them as part of their arsenal to
secure guilty pleas.144
The Marissa Alexander case highlights another problem with mandatory minimums. Although
mandatory minimums were intended to ensure that similar acts were punished similarly, in
reality, due to plea bargaining, mandatory minimums instead often are only used against those
who go to trial or otherwise can’t negotiate around the mandatory sentence. There is no doubt
that Marissa Alexander used a gun. There is a question whether the act of firing the gun was a
criminal act (an assault). Before trial, the prosecution made plea offers that took the mandatory
twenty years in prison for using a gun off the table. After Ms. Alexander’s conviction at her first
trial, the judge had no choice, under the law, but to sentence her to the twenty years.145
Mandatory minimums, either for the existing charge or through enhancements, increase the
pressure on defendants to accept plea deals, increase the potential trial penalty, and increase the
disparity between defendants who committed otherwise similar acts.
V.  Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The now classic article to examine and describe how the substantive law can impact
bargaining behavior was published in 1979 and described the bargaining behavior in divorce
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cases as happening in the “shadow of the law.”146 The article concluded that there were a
number of reasons why the substantive family law mattered in how the parties approached
negotiating divorce, custody, and support issues. Years later, in 2004, Stefanos Bibas, critically
analyzed plea bargaining scholarship that adopted one piece of the shadow of the law theory, the
“shadow of trial.”147 Bibas concluded that trial outcomes are only one piece of a much more
complex dynamic.148 Bibas argued for the need to recognize these other complexities and not
simply look at plea bargaining behavior in the context of trial outcomes.149 In considering plea
bargaining reform it is useful to first explore how the shadow of the law theory may explain plea
bargaining behavior to better understand why it is also necessary to reform the substantive
criminal law as part of any meaningful plea bargaining reform effort.
A.  The Shadow of the Law:
In Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, Robert Mnookin and
Lewis Kornhausert examined how the law impacted divorce negotiations “outside the
courtroom”150 and suggested that divorce law did not impose “order from above” but rather
provided a “framework” for the negotiations.151 Mnookin and Kornhausert concluded that the
existing laws on “custody, alimony, child support, and marital property are all striking for their
lack of precision and thus provide a bargaining backdrop clouded by uncertainty.”152 However,
this uncertainty in the law did not mean that the law was irrelevant to the negotiations.
In examining how divorce negotiations worked, Mnookin and Kornhausert identified five
factors that they concluded were important in determining the outcome of divorce negotiations.
The five factors were: “(1) the preferences of the divorcing parents; (2) the bargaining
endowments created by legal rules that indicate the particular allocation a court will impose if the
parties fail to reach agreement; (3) the degree of uncertainty concerning the legal outcome if
the parties go to court, which is linked to the parties’ attitudes towards risk; (4) transaction costs
and the parties’ respective abilities to bear them; and (5) strategic behavior.”153
Mnookin and Kornhausert discussed how the substantive law can impact these factors.
For example, if custody is determined under a “best interests of the child standard” as compared
146
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to a “maternal-preference rule” or a “joint custody rule” it changes the bargaining power of each
parent.154 Under a rule where mothers are presumed to get custody, fathers will have relatively
little bargaining power.155 Likewise, rules that give fathers more equality in custody, particularly
when combined with laws that limit alimony, give fathers more bargaining power.156
Mnookin and Kornhausert looked at the impact that changes in the law may have on
whether the parties reach an agreement. The example that they gave is a proposal to give the
custodial parent, whoever it might be, the exclusive right to determine when the non-custodial
parent can visit, if at all and joint custody would not be a possibility.157 The problem with a rule
like this, as Mnookin and Kornhausert explained, is that it makes it harder for divorcing parents
to agree on custody and reach “initial agreement” as this proposed rule would prevent the parties
from agreeing to promises regarding visitation beyond who has custody.158
Under Mnookin and Kornhausert’s analysis, the shadow of the law in the context of
divorce cases exists in two pieces: the applicable legal codes and how the courts might decide
any divorce case that fails to settle. In looking at the how the law influenced divorce
negotiations, Mnookin and Kornhausert used as a reference point what the courts might do and
the fact that any divorce case that is not settled through negotiation will go to trial.159
B. Does the Shadow of the Law Theory Apply to Plea Bargaining?
Twenty five years after the Shadow of the Law was published, Stephanos Bibas criticized
applying Mnookin and Kornhauser’s second piece of the analysis, how the courts might decide a
case, to the plea bargaining context.160 Bibas took issue with scholars who looked at “plea
bargaining as just another case of bargaining in the shadow of expected trial outcomes.”161 Bibas,
concluded that the “shadow-of-trial” model was “far too simplistic” when looking at the
relationship between criminal trials and plea bargains.162 Bibas defined the “shadow of trials” to
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mean “the influence exerted by the strength of the evidence and expected punishment after
trial.”163 Bibas concluded that plea bargaining is more complex as there are “structural
impediments that distort bargaining” such as bad lawyers, the rules surrounding bail, and
mandatory sentences.164 The second big problem, according to Bibas, with applying a shadow of
trials theory is that it “assumes that the actors are fundamentally rational” in plea bargaining.165
Bibas briefly examines the impact that the legal framework has on plea bargaining, but
not as Mnookin and Kornhausert did. In the Shadow of the Law, Mnookin and Kornhausert
discuss not just trial outcomes, but how the substantive law of divorce impacts or could impact,
divorce negotiations. Bibas, by focusing on trial outcomes, gives little attention to the first
question: how much does the substantive legal framework impact plea bargaining? Bibas
rightly points out that trial outcomes are not as important as a shadow of trials theory might
suggest in the specific context of plea bargaining as there are many other factors that influence
bargaining behavior. In doing so, Bibas recognizes the importance of the substantive criminal
law in terms of mandatory sentences and sentencing guidelines that contribute to the “structural
skewing of bargains.” 166 As Bibas explains it, mandatory sentencing guidelines and mandatory
minimums make it so that punishment is no longer “calibrated” to the “strength of the evidence”
as these statutory provisions “act as sledgehammers” that crash down on defendants if the crime
was committed under certain circumstances, regardless of the severity of the criminal act.167
Bibas concludes that the inflexibility of the substantive criminal law impacts plea bargaining and
examines how it might encourage cooperation from defendants to get better deals as defendants
will “look for ways to smooth out the sharp peaks and valleys” of the substantive laws.168
Mnookin and Kornhausert’s conclusion that the divorce law provides the framework for
divorce negotiations is equally applicable in plea bargaining. As with divorce cases, the
substantive criminal law creates “bargaining endowments” for the prosecution and gives them far
greater power in plea negotiations. Marissa Alexander’s case illustrates how an extreme possible
sentence can give the prosecutor power in the bargaining process to pressure a defendant to
accept the deal or face the high sentence. For many laws, such as the mandatory use-a-gun laws
in Florida, the legal outcome is not uncertain if the defendant is convicted: the defendant will get
the mandatory minimum. There is a degree of uncertainty in how a jury may see an offered
defense and whether they will vote to acquit. In such situations, Mnookin and Kornhausert
discussed that the decision of whether to negotiate a settlement or not will depend on the how the
parties view risk.169 There is a serious concern that innocent defendants may be more risk averse
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than the guilty and more likely, therefore, to take deals, especially if the potential consequences
of losing at trial are more serious.170 Mnookin and Kornhausert also point to the transaction
costs and the parties willingness to bear them as one of the factors influencing bargaining
behavior in divorce cases.171 As with the above factors, defendants are often at a serious
disadvantage as the transaction costs of not taking the deal can include the general
unpleasantness of making court appearances and the possibility of spending more time in
custody awaiting their trial than the time-served deal.172
While any single theory explaining plea bargaining (or any form of negotiation) will
undoubtedly over-simplify the analysis of how the process works, it is still useful to analyze
whether the shadow of the law applies to plea bargaining. One of Bibas’ concerns about the
focus on the shadow of trial theory is that by doing so scholars failed to look critically enough at
how plea bargaining works and the need for reform.173 As Bibas said, if trials are the “backstop”
to plea bargaining then “we do not need new procedural safeguards for pleas because plea
outcomes already incorporate the value of trial safeguards.”174 However, it is precisely because
of the complexities of plea bargaining that it is important to understand the variety of factors that
influence bargaining behavior, particularly if the goal is to reform plea bargaining. One of the
factors that exerts a strong influence in the parties bargaining behavior in plea negotiations is the
substantive criminal law. Therefore it is important to not only look to what additional law or
regulation may help improve the plea bargaining process, but to also not overlook the importance
of reforming the underlying criminal law as a part of reforming plea bargaining.
VI. Reforming Plea Bargaining After Lafler and Frye:
As discussed above, the Supreme Court has decided few cases on plea bargaining and
even fewer that place limits on the plea bargaining process. Therefore, the 2012 cases of Lafler
v. Cooper175 and Missouri v. Frye176 made some observers optimistic that these cases heralded a
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new era and would have a “significant effect.”177 As I have written elsewhere these cases are
likely to have a much more limited impact.178 However, these cases, have sparked renewed
scholarly interest in plea bargaining and may spark renewed efforts to reform plea bargaining.
Nationwide, there is a growing interest in criminal justice reform that cuts across partisan
political lines.179 Much of the interest is focused on decreasing high incarceration rates.180 This
interest is not limited to academics, but instead includes legislators and has already involved
some significant changes in state criminal laws. For example, the Sentencing Project reported
that in 2014 alone “at least 30 states and the District of Columbia authorized a range of law
changes and policies that may address the nation’s scale of incarceration.”181 Although these
legislative changes are aimed at decreasing incarceration rates they may have a significant
impact on how plea bargaining works. If done right, legislative reforms aimed at reducing
incarceration rates could also help to significantly lessen the often coercive atmosphere in plea
bargaining.
California is an example of a state that has restructured its criminal law to reduce possible
sentences and to reduce some offenses from felonies to misdemeanors. These new laws were not
intended to reform plea bargaining, but were instead intended to decrease incarceration rates in
the state.182 Over-crowding in California prisons is so serious that the state has been under a
continuing federal court order, since 2009, to reduce its prison population.183 The first significant
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change in the California Penal Code was Proposition 36, which passed in 2012, and amended the
three-strikes law.184 Previously, any defendant convicted of any new felony, if they had two
prior convictions for serious and violent felonies, faced a sentence of twenty-five years to life.185
This meant that if a defendant had two prior convictions for residential burglary and was
convicted on a drug possession, or petty theft with a prior, that defendant would be sentenced to
twenty-five years to life in prison, unless the case was plea bargained for less.186 Proposition 36
changed the law by requiring that the new criminal case also be a serious or violent felony.
Proposition 36 also included a retroactivity clause, allowing up to 3000 defendants sentenced
under the old law to be resentenced.187
To date, it is not clear how this change in law has changed, or not, plea bargaining
practices in California. Under both the old and new law, prosecutors have discretion to file cases
as three-strike cases and to “strike strikes” as part of the plea bargaining process. This meant that
some cases that could be three-strike cases were reduced in plea bargaining to second-strike
cases. For example, a typical three-strike of possession for sale of one rock of crack cocaine
alleged as a three-strike case under the old law due to two prior strike offenses could have been
reduced in plea bargaining. The prosecution could offer to reduce the case to a second-strike
case with a sentence of eight years in prison (compared to twenty-five to life). Defendants who
were facing twenty-five to life sentences often jumped at the opportunity to take those reduced
sentences. Proposition 36 prevents prosecutors from threatening to add strikes, or offering to take
them away, when the new criminal case is not a serious or violent felony. The change in law
took away one significant category of possible mandatory minimum sentences and therefore,
possibly, one opportunity for prosecutors to threaten higher sentences if a defendant did not take
the plea deal. One of the problems with three-strike cases is that they were often “no offer”
cases, which means the prosecutor refused to make an offer, often due to office-wide policies.188
As with other charges, prosecutors can exercise wide discretion on how to handle three strikes
cases from the initial charging decisions to the decision of whether to offer a plea bargain. There
are no studies yet analyzing the impact of Proposition 36 on plea bargaining in California. The
focus has been instead on its impact in reducing the prison population.
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The second change in the law in California is potentially even more far-reaching.
Proposition 47 passed in November, 2014, and reduced some felonies to misdemeanors,
including drug and property crimes.189 It also allowed those who have already been sentenced
to be re-sentenced under the new law.190 It is still too early to evaluate the long-term impact.
The initial reports seem to suggest that there will be fewer arrests. The old law, as one Deputy
Public Defender in Los Angeles, Russell Griffith remarked, “….gave the cops an enormously
strong incentive to arrest people because they were cheap statistics.”191 Early reports are that
arrests are down dramatically for narcotics offenses which are no longer felonies.192 Overall, in
Los Angeles County, narcotics arrests decreased by 30% and overall bookings into the Los
Angeles County Jail were down by 23% since the adoption of Proposition 47.193 The decrease in
arrests has meant that county jail inmates now serve more of their time as the need for early
release due to over-crowding has decreased.194 It is unclear what impact Proposition 47 may be
having on plea bargaining. For example, are prosecutors decreasing county jail time offers due to
the understanding that an inmate will serve more time on a sixty day sentence than they did in the
past?
Another question is what will be the fate of problem-solving courts, such as drug courts,
in the wake of this change in law? Possession of controlled substances is now a misdemeanor.
Without the threat of a felony conviction, at least some prosecutors are worried that defendants
will no longer agree to drug rehabilitation or other treatment as part of a sentence, particularly as
the possible sentences are now dramatically lower. As one Los Angeles County District
Attorney observed, in such cases, defendants serve little time in the county jail and in “just a few
minutes and they’re out. You have removed that leverage” of the higher possible sentence.195
Removing that kind of leverage could make a significant difference in how plea
bargaining works, at least in terms of potentially coercive prosecutorial plea bargaining behavior.
Proposition 47 removes the option to file certain offenses as felonies. As Wright and Engen
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observed in their study, prosecutors are less likely to reduce charges to a misdemeanor.196 John
Pfaff, who has done extensive empirical work to better understand the causes of mass
incarceration in the United States, concludes that the increase in incarceration in the 1990s and
2000s was “driven almost entirely by change in precisely one part of the criminal justice chain—
the prosecutor’s decision to file a felony claim.”197 Removing this option may help to not only
reduce incarceration rates overall, but may also help to limit or restrict prosecutors using the
potential of harsher charges and penalties as pressure in the plea negotiation process, for at least
some categories of crimes.
California’s reforms may influence other states to take similar actions. The key questions
for future research include not only whether incarceration rates decrease, but also whether the
changes in the law cause changes in plea bargaining and prosecutorial behavior. Are prosecutors
filing a lower percentage of cases because they can only file them as misdemeanors?198 Are trial
rates increasing? Increasing trial rates would be one indicator that the pressure to plead guilty has
reduced, although arguably an outcome that none of the professionals in the criminal justice
system would be anxious to see.199 Careful study of the impact of these changes in the specific
context of plea bargaining, could help to understand what reforms of the underlying criminal law
might make sense as part of the process of reforming plea bargaining.
VII. Conclusion
As Malcom M. Feeley observed, during an earlier era when many were calling for plea
bargaining reform, “[r]eforms that focus exclusively on one narrow problem without seeing it in
the context of the entire system may generate unanticipated consequences even less desirable
than the status quo.”200 In fairness, plea bargaining critics in this era who call for procedural
reforms are often doing so in ways that are far-reaching and not focused on narrow problems.
However, as this article has discussed, they tend to do so without including recommendations to
reform the underlying criminal law. This is a key area to not overlook. The possibility of harsh
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penalties, combined with prosecutors having the discretionary power to charge the same act as a
felony or misdemeanor and to add a variety of sentencing enhancements, contribute to what is
often a highly coercive atmosphere in plea bargaining. Plea bargaining is a form of negotiation
that most certainly does not exist outside the law, but is instead a process framed by the
underlying criminal law. Reformers need to recognize this key part of how plea bargaining
works and move beyond focusing primarily on procedural reform to include broader discussions
of criminal code reform as part of any effort to reform plea bargaining.
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